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V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), 
Utah Code Annotated and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling federal social security benefits may be considered as 
marital property subject to division by state courts as Congress has preempted Utah state 
domestic relations law? 
Standard of Review: Issues which involve application of statutory law to the facts present 
mixed questions of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and conclusions of 
law for correctness affording the court some discretion in applying the law to the facts. State Ex 
Rel. J.B. 53 P.3rd 963 (Utah App. 2002). 
Issue Preserved: Transcript p.345 - 346; Transcript p.702 - 705; Record p. 258 Appellant 
Carolyn A. Olsen filed a Trial Memorandum on March 11, 2005 before the trial briefing the issue 
of division of social security benefits. 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that social security benefits are marital assets subject to 
division by state courts as they do not qualify as marital property? 
Standard of Review: Issues which involve application of statutory law to the facts present 
mixed questions of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and conclusions of 
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law for correctness affording the court some discretion in applying the laws to the facts. State Ex. 
Rel. J.B. 53 P.3rd 963 (Utah App. 2002). 
Issued Preserved: Record p. 345 - 346; Record p. 702 - 705; Record P. 258 Appellant 
Carolyn A. Olsen filed a Trial Memorandum on March 11, 2005 before the trial briefing the issue 
of division of social security benefits. 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. 5 U.S.C. §8345(j) 
2. 5 U.S.C. §8435(d)(l) and (2) 
3. 42 U.S.C. §402 
4. 42 U.S.C. §407(a) 
5. 42 U.S.C. §659(a) 
6. 42 U.S.C. §1304 
7. Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5-(l) 
8. Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
9. Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a domestic relations case in which Carolyn Olsen filed for divorce against Mark 
Olsen on December 11, 2003. A non-jury trial was held before District Court Judge, Scott M. 
Hadley, on March 14, March 18, and April 4, 2005. 
The trial court ruled the present value of Carolyn Olsen's social security benefits was 
$115,434.00 even though Carolyn was age 52 at the time of trial and had to reach age 66 before 
she would receive a monthly Social Security check. The trial court further ruled the present 
value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits was a marital asset and should be included in 
equalizing the parties' marital assets. 
Carolyn filed a Notice of Appeal on July 19, 2006 after Mark Olsen's motion for new 
trial was denied. 
At the time of trial, Carolyn Olsen was fifty two (52) years of age. She was born on April 
2, 1953. Carolyn is a school teacher employed by the Weber County School District and teaches 
5th grade at Valley Elementary in Huntsville, Utah. Carolyn contributes to social security each 
pay period. Carolyn is a member of the Utah State Retirement System having acquired 
retirement benefits in a defined benefit plan (pension plan) and also a defined contribution plan 
(40IK plan). 
Mark Olsen is a federal civil service employee presently employed at Hill Air Force Base. 
At the time of trial Mark was fifty-five (55) years of age. He was born on October 30, 1949. 
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Mark does not contribute to social security. Mark has acquired retirement benefits in a defined 
benefit plan (pension) known as CSRS and Mark also voluntarily contributes to a defined 
contribution plan known as Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). 
As of the time of trial, Carolyn had contributed $53,196.00 to the Social Security System 
from her employment as a school teacher. Mark called Brent Griffeths, CPA, as an expert 
witness to testify what the present value of Carolyn Olsen's social security benefits would be as 
of March 1, 2005, the date of trial, assuming Carolyn lived to age 66 when she was eligible to 
receive social security benefits. 
The trial court made a finding Carolyn's social security benefits had a present value at the 
time of trial of $115,434.00. The trial court found Carolyn's social security benefits to be a 
marital asset and awarded Carolyn her social security benefits valued at $115,434.00 in 
calculating the total marital assets awarded to her. The trial court found Mark Olsen's total 
marital assets to be $303,659.00, and Carolyn's to be $322,502.00 including the present value of 
her social security benefits of $115,434.00. Carolyn was ordered to pay Mark $9,421.50 to 
equalize their marital assets. 
Carolyn Olsen appeals the trial court's ruling that Utah courts in domestic cases may 
consider the present value of a spouse's social security benefits to be a marital asset subject to 
division by the court. Carolyn, also on appeal, argues that Congress, in passing federal statutes 
regarding social security benefits, preempted Utah courts from determining social security 
benefits are marital assets subject to division. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Carolyn Olsen and Mark Olsen were married on May 5, 1978 in Eden, Weber County, 
Utah. Record, p. 1. 
2. Carolyn is gainfully employed as a school teacher for the Weber County School 
District, Record, p.2. 
3. Mark is a civil service employee at Hill Air Force Base gainfully employed as a 
contract officer. Record, p.2. 
4. Carolyn has acquired during the marriage a defined benefit and a defined contribution 
retirement plan with the State of Utah. Record, p.3. 
5. Mark has acquired during the marriage a defined benefit and a defined contribution 
retirement plan with the United States government. Record, p.3. 
6. Carolyn contributes $216.03 per month to social security from her monthly income. 
Transcript, p.40-41. 
7. Mark Olsen does not contribute to social security as he contributes to the Civil Service 
Retirement System defined benefit plan. Exhibit 5 and 6. Transcript, p. 394 - 395. 
8. Brent Griffiths, CPA, was called by Mark Olsen, as an expert witness in accounting 
and present value calculation of future stream of income. Transcript, p. 321. 
9. Brent Griffiths was called to testify as to the present value of the parties' retirement 
plans and Carolyn's social security benefits. Transcript, p. 322-325. 
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10. Brent Griffith testified the present value of Carolyn's social security benefits was 
$127,323.06 based upon Carolyn's projected life expectancy and assuming she starting receiving 
social security benefits at age 66. In other words, $127,323.06 would have to be invested now at 
4.6% for Carolyn to receive $1,647.00 a month for her estimated life expectancy. Transcript, p. 
330. 
11. The trial court questioned Brent Griffiths's regarding the present value of Carolyn's 
social security benefits commencing at age 66. Transcript, p.337. 
12. The trial court wanted to know the present value of Carolyn's social security benefits 
commencing at her present age of 52 years recognizing that social security benefits would not be 
paid until Carolyn reached age 66. Transcript, p.337-340. 
13. The trial court found the present value of Carolyn's social security benefits at the 
time of trial was $115,435.24. Exhibit R 22, Findings of Fact No. 72, and Conclusions of Law 
No.14. 
14. The trial court considered Carolyn's present value of her social security benefits to be 
a marital asset. Conclusion of Law No. 20. 
15. The trial court ordered Carolyn to pay Mark $9,421.50 to equalize the parties marital 
assets considering Carolyn's marital assets were $322,502.00 including the present value of her 
social security benefits and Mark's were $303,659.00. Conclusions of Law No. 21 and No. 22. 
16. Carolyn objected to the admission of the present valuation of Carolyn's social 
security benefits as calculated by Brent Griffiths, CPA. Transcript, p. 345-346; Transcript, 
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p.702-705. 
17. Carolyn filed on March 11, 2005 prior to trial a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities briefing and objecting to the evidence of the value of Carolyn's social security 
benefits as a marital asset. Record, p. 258. 
18. The trial court concluded, since there was no established controlling law, Carolyn 
Oisen's social security benefits were a marital asset and credited her with $115,435.00 of marital 
property. Conclusions of Law No. 14. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First of all, social security benefits should not be characterized as marital property subject 
to division because Congress's enactment of the Social Security Act preempted state divorce law. 
Congress's intent to preempt state divorce law can be seen in several ways. 42 U.S.C. §407(a) 
provides the right of any person to any future payment shall not be transferable or assignable at 
law or in equity. 42 U.S.C.§407(b) states no other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after 
April 20, 1983 may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this 
section. 
42 U.S.C. §402 provides certain social security benefits to a former spouse who was 
married to the retiree for at least 10 years. However, being awarded a share of the retiree's 
monthly social security benefits is not a right awarded to an ex-spouse. 42 U.S.C. §1304 states 
-7-
the right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the 
Congress. This section indicates Congress intended to keep social security under federal control. 
Effective December 14, 1999 consent was given by the United States Congress to permit 
income withholding, garnishment, and similar proceedings for enforcement of child support and 
alimony obligations of any individual to the same extent as if the United States were a private 
person. 42 U.S.C. §659(a). Thus, social security benefits may be garnished to collect child 
support and alimony. However, the term alimony "does not include any payment or transfer of 
property by an individual to the spouse or a former spouse of the individual in compliance with 
any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of 
property between spouses or former spouses. 42 U.S.C. §659(i)(3)(B)(ii). 
Social security is similar to other federal retirement plans. Thus, United States Supreme 
Court decisions about other federal retirement programs are instructive. In Hisquierdo v. 
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S. Ct. 802, 59 L. Ed. 2d. 1 (1979), the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Supreme Court of California holding California must defer to the federal statutory 
scheme for allocating Railroad Retirement Act benefits in so far as the terms of federal law 
require. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the State of California's decision that a railroad 
pension was divisible community property because benefits flowed from employment during the 
marriage. The United States Supreme Court concluded that division of railroad retirement 
benefits in divorce proceedings was prohibited by 45 U.S.C. §23 lm which protected benefits 
from legal process and exempted benefits from taxation, garnishment and attachment. 
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The area of military retirement is another federal retirement program that must be 
interrupted under federal law. In McCarty v. McCarty. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct., 2728, 69 L.Ed. 
2d. 589 (1981), the United States Supreme Court reversed the California decision permitting 
sharing of military retirement benefits in divorce cases. The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
federal law, which it interpreted as prohibiting such a division, prevails over conflicting state 
laws based upon the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. After McCarty, Congress enacted the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA), to permit a state court to treat 
military retirement pay as individual or joint property according to state law. 
Mark Olsen's two federal retirement plans are divisible with his former spouse, Carolyn 
Olsen, pursuant to federal statutes. These federal statutes specifically permit state courts in 
divorce proceedings to award former spouses a portion of the federal employee's retirement 
benefits. 5 U.S.C. §8345(j) permits state courts to award a former spouse CSRS benefits payable 
to the employee based on the employee's service. Mark's Thrift Savings Plan is divisible with 
Carolyn pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §8435(d)(l) and (2). By implementation of these federal statutes 
Congress has consented to state courts authority to divide these federal retirement programs. 
Unless and until Congress concludes social security is a divisible property right, state 
courts may not consider social security benefits as a marital asset divisible in domestic relations 
proceedings. The historical treatment of railroad retirement benefits, military retirement benefits, 
and federal retirement benefits are examples that federal law preempts state divorce law. 
Secondly, social security benefits do not meet the functional definition of a marital asset. 
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Social security benefits have no present asset value. They do not vest in any meaningful way 
until one meets age and other requirements imposed by federal law. Social security benefits do 
not meet the definition, under Utah law, of a marital asset which is defined functionally as any 
right that has accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit. 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court held that social security benefits were not 
an accrued property right. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S. Ct. 1367, 4 L. Ed. 1435 
(1960). Accordingly, pursuant to Utah and United States Supreme Court case law, because 
social security benefits are not an accrued property right they are not subject to distribution by 
state courts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING FEDERAL 
FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS MAY BE 
CONSIDERED AS MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT 
TO DIVISION BY STATE COURTS AS CONGRESS 
HAS PREEMPTED STATE DIVORCE LAW 
Social security benefits should not be characterized as marital property subject to division 
because Congress's enactment of the Social Security Act preempted state divorce law. To permit 
a state to classify such benefits as subject to the equal interest of each spouse would conflict 
sharply with the federal purpose of securing the pay as a benefit solely for the individual retiree. 
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Congress's intention to preempt state divorce law can be seen in several ways: First, the 
right to future social security payment is non-transferrable and non-assignable at law or in equity. 
42 U.S.C. §407(a). No other provisions of law enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983 may 
be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section. 42 U.S.C. 
§407(b). 
Secondly, the Social Security Act expressly provides for divorced individuals as a former 
spouse who was married to the retiree for at least ten (10) years and any dependent children are 
entitled to certain federal social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. §402. However, no federal statute 
permits division of an individual's social security monthly annuity benefits to a former spouse 
evidencing a clear intent by Congress that social security benefits are not marital assets divisible 
in state divorce cases. 
Only the United States Congress has authority to amend or repeal the Social Security Act. 
42 U.S.C. §1304 states "the right to alter , amend or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby 
reserved to the Congress." This federal statute further reflects the intention of Congress to keep 
the Social Security Act under the control of the federal government. 
Congress gave its consent on December 14, 1999 that moneys due an individual based 
upon remuneration for employment is subject to income withholding, garnishment, and similar 
proceedings for enforcement of child support and alimony obligations. However, the term 
"alimony" did not include any payment or transfer of property by an individual "to the spouse or 
a former spouse of the individual in compliance with any community property settlement, 
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equitable distribution of property or other division of property between spouses or former 
spouses." 42 U.S.C. §659(j)(3)(B)(ii). 
Since social security is similar to other federal retirement plans it is instructive to analyze 
court decisions interpreting other federal retirement programs. Railroad retirement is such a 
federal retirement program. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 
id., that it was improper, in a California divorce proceeding, to award the wife an interest in the 
husband's expected Railroad Retirement Act benefits. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held "California must defer to the federal statutory scheme for 
allocating Railroad Retirement Act benefits insofar as the terms of federal law require." 99 S. Ct. 
at 808. The Court concluded that division of railroad retirement benefits in divorce actions was 
prohibited by 45 U.S.C. §231 m which protected benefits from taxation, garnishment, and 
attachment. 99 S. Ct. at 809. 
After Hisquierdo Congress amended 45 U.S.C. §23 lm permitting distribution of upper 
tier railroad retirement benefits. The State of North Dakota recognized that lower tier railroad 
retirement benefits were analogous to social security and ruled lower tier benefits could not be 
considered, distributed, or offset in marital property division. Belt v. Belt 398 N.W. 2d 737 
(N.D. 1987). The Supreme Court of North Dakota held the trial court in a divorce action could 
not award the wife the equity in the marital home and the husband retain the lower tier railroad 
retirement benefits ruling the lower tier benefits were equivalent to social security and not subject 
to adjustment by state courts, even indirectly by offset. 
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Review of the right of division between spouses of military retirement benefits presents 
another example that Congress has preempted state divorce law in dividing federal military 
retired pay. In a California divorce case it was held at trial that the husband's military retired pay 
was community property and divisible with the wife. The United States Supreme Court reversed 
ruling that California state divorce law conflicted with federal law for distributing military 
retirement benefits. McCartv v. McCartv. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 
(1981). 
In 1982 Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act 
(USFSPA) permitting State courts to treat military retirement pay as individual or joint property 
according to state law. However, domestic law in Utah followed McCartv until Congress 
enacted USFSPA consenting to allow states to divide military retirement pay according to its 
own state law. 
Preemption of Mark Olsen's two federal retirement plans is not an issue in this case as 
Congress has expressly consented that a federal retiree's CSRS and Thrift Savings retirement 
plans may be divided between spouses in state divorce actions. 5 U.S.C. §8345(j) permits 
division of Mark's CSRS retirement plan by the trial court in this case and 5 U.S.C. §8435(d) (1) 
and (2) permits division of Mark's Thrift Savings Plan. 
A significant number of courts in other states prohibit a trial court from considering social 
security benefits as a marital asset and also prohibit awarding other property as an offset for 
social security benefits. In Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W. 2d 1, 11 (1989), the Supreme Court of 
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North Dakota held: 
Although marital property is generally under state control, 
it is clear to us that Congress wants social security to be 
exclusively federally controlled. Congress preempted state 
divorce laws when it enacted its own scheme of social 
security benefits for divorced spouses. The anti-assignment 
and anti-legal-process provisions in the Social Security Act, 
with their specific allowance for spousal support, also promote 
federal uniformity and preempt state law. We conclude that 
social security cannot be distributed or used as an offset in 
division of marital property. To do so would conflict with the 
federal plan and would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution. Any change in the allocation of social security 
at divorce must come from Congress. 
In Luna v. Luna, 125 Ariz. 120, 608 P.2d 57, 61, (1979), the Court of Appeals from 
Arizona held the husband's social security disability benefits were his sole and separate property 
and no offsetting award could be made to the wife. 
In Richard v. Richard. 659 S.W. 2d 746, 749, (1983), the Court of Appeals of Texas, 
reversed the trial courts division of one half of the husband's social security disability benefits 
holding disability benefits are similar to social security benefits and are not likewise subject to 
division under community property laws due to federal preemption. 
In Swan v. Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 753 (1986) the trial court used the value of both husband 
and wife's social security benefits in calculating the total value of the property to be divided in 
determining how much property should be awarded to each spouse. The Supreme Court of 
Oregon held the value of social security benefits of either spouse may not be considered in the 
division of property. 
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In Sherry v. Sherry. 701 P.2d 265, 270-271 (1985), the Court of Appeals of Idaho held, 
A ruling that social security benefits are divisible community 
assets would seriously interfere with the express statutory 
scheme of the Social Security Act and is forbidden by the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Art. 6 CI.2). 
In Re Marriage of Nizenkuff 135 Cal. Rptr. at 192. We believe 
the California decisions are well reasoned. We therefore hold 
old age and survivor benefits under the Social Security Act are 
not a divisible community asset. 
H 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS ARE 
SUBJECT TO DIVISION BY STATE COURTS 
AS THEY DO NOT QUALIFY AS MARITAL 
PROPERTY 
Pursuant to §30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, a trial court may when rendering a decree 
of divorce "include in its equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts, or obligations, 
and the parties." A trial court must consider all assets acquired by the parties during the 
marriage. Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982). 
In Jefferies vs. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 737-848 (Utah App. 1995) the Court of Appeals 
emphasized that in Utah two principles are clear whether an economic resource or asset acquired 
during marriage is subject to equitable distribution. The Court held: 
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First, all assets acquired by the parties during marriage 
are to be considered by the trial court when making an 
equitable distribution, unless the law specifically prevents 
the court from considering a particular asset. Second, a 
marital asset is defined functionally as any right that has 
accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit. 
In Jefferies the Court was faced with the issue of whether a 401(a) retirement plan was a 
marital asset subject to equitable division. The 401(a) plan is offered and administered by an 
inter-governmental agency in lieu of participation in the federal social security system. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling the funds accumulated in the husband's 401(a) 
plan during the marriage clearly fit the definition of a marital asset and further, there was no 
statutory or case law preventing the Court from considering the 401(a) plan a marital asset. 
In dicta, found in footnote 2, the Court of Appeals stated: 
The fact that participation in a 401(a) plan is in lieu of 
participation in the federal social security plan does not 
change the result. An asset is to be considered if it meets 
the functional definition of a marital asset. Funds in a 
401(a) plan meet the definition, as they represent a right 
accrued during marriage to receive a present or future 
benefit, while payments into the federal social security 
plan do not. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610, 
80 S. Ct 1367, 1372, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1435 (1960) ("To engraft 
upon the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued 
property rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and 
boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which 
it demands."). 
In addition, Congress has enacted its own scheme of social 
security benefits for divorced spouses. See 42 U.S.C. §402 
(Supp. 1995). This, among other things, has led many courts 
to conclude that Congress has preempted state divorce laws 
and, therefore, social security benefits cannot be considered 
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marital property. See e.g., Olson vs. Olson, 445 N.W. 2d 1, 
(N.D. 1989) 11 (N.D. 1989). Because the consideration of 
expected social security benefits as marital assets is not directly 
at issue in this case, it is unnecessary for us to reach this question. 
However, we note that even absent the argument that Congress 
has preempted any consideration of social security benefits as 
marital property, under our law, social security would have no 
place in the consideration of marital assets in this case. Unlike 
the §401(a) plan here, social security benefits have no present 
asset value. They do not vest in any meaningful way until one 
meets age and other requirements imposed by federal law. Con-
tributions toward social security cannot be withdrawn, borrowed 
against, assigned, given away, or otherwise treated as a present 
asset. Clearly, any other form of "right" or "plan" that is similarly 
unavailable prior to retirement would also not be a marital asset 
for purposes of pre-retirement division or distribution. 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor, id., court held that 
social security benefits are not an accrued property right. The Supreme Court stated: 
To engraft upon the social security system a concept of accrued 
property rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness 
in adjustment to everchanging conditions which it demands. See 
Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social Security Benefits, 37 Ore. L. 
Rev. 299, 359. It was doubtless out of an awareness of the need 
for such flexibility that Congress included in the original Act, and 
has since retained, a clause expressly reserving to it '(f)he right 
to alter, amend, or repeal any provision* of the Act. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah and United States Supreme Court case law, social security 
benefits are not an accrued property right and cannot be classified as a marital asset subject to 
distribution by State courts. It is submitted there is established ample controlling law that social 
security benefits may not be considered as a marital asset in divorce proceedings contrary to the 
trial courts Conclusion of Law No. 14. 
-17-
CONCLUSION 
Social security benefits should not be characterized as marital property subject to division 
by Utah District Courts because Congress intended to keep social security under federal control 
with the enactment of the Social Security Act. Congress's intention to preempt state divorce law 
is shown by Congress's inclusion of the anti-assignment clause which forbids it; by Congress's 
inclusion of a clause which permits only Congress to alter, amend, or repeal the Social Security 
Act; and Congress expressly provided for divorced individuals under the Social Security Act. 
Clearly, Congress intended to secure social security pay as a benefit solely for the individual 
retiree. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Utah and United States Supreme Court case law, Carolyn 
Olsen's social security benefits are her separate property and not a marital asset subject to 
division or even consideration as an offset, by a Utah trial court. 
DATED this V day of January, 2007. 
ROBERT L. NEELI 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Carolyn A. Olsen 
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S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner Carolyn A. Olsen is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent 
Mark Olsen on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final upon entry. 
2. Petitioner, Carolyn A. Olsen is awarded the care custody and control of Jesse Olsen 
subject to Respondent's standard parent time. 
3. Through June 30, 2005, Respondent Mark Olsen shall pay to Petitioner Carolyn 
Olsen, base child support of $527.00 per month for the support and maintenance of Jesse Olsen. 
4. Respondent Mark Olsen shall also pay $465.00 per month alimony to Petitioner 
Carolyn Olsen, also through June 30, 2005, when it shall be replaced by a permanent award of 
alimony. 
5. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen shall continue to maintain medical insurance for the benefit 
of the entire family through June 30, 2005, and may continue to maintain medical and health 
insurance for the benefit of the parties' two children thereafter, as long as they are eligible to 
receive medical insurance benefits under Carolyn Olsen's medical plan. 
6. The marital residence located at 5268 East 2200 North, Eden, Weber County, Utah, 
shall be sold effective July 1, 2005. Respondent Mark Olsen shall provide the names of three real 
estate agents to Petitioner Carolyn Olsen who shall choose one. In the event all of the designated 
real estate agents selected by Respondent Mark Olsen are not acceptable to Petitioner Carolyn 
Olsen, she may submit the matter to the Court for decision. If the Court finds either party has 
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H been unreasonable in choosing or selecting a real estate agent, the Court may grant attorney's 
fees. 
7. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen may continue to occupy the marital residence paying the 
minimal monthly payment thereon of approximately $700.00 per month, all utilities, and a pro-
rata share of taxes and home owners' insurance until sold. 
8. At the time of the sale of the property, either party may bid to purchase the home and 
therefore, the home shall be sold to the highest bidder. 
9. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen shall not be granted a reduction of approximately 
$11,000.00 principal from the line of credit obligation for payments made solely by her from date 
of separation to date of trial for the reason that she occupied the marital residence and because 
Respondent Mark Olsen paid alimony based, in part, upon the traditional house payment of 
$1,000.00 per month. Additionally, Petitioner, Carolyn Olsen enjoyed the use of the bulk of the 
personalty in the home. 
10. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen shall be granted return of her pre-marital contribution of 
$10,000.00 and Respondent Mark Olsen shall be granted return of his pre-marital contribution of 
$20,500.00 from the marital residence at the time the home is sold. Upon sale of the marital 
residence, the proceeds shall be expended as follows: (a) the costs of sale; (b) payment of 
outstanding balance on the line of credit; (c) Carolyn Olsen restored her pre-marital contribution 
of $10,000.00; (d) Mark Olsen restored his pre-marital contribution of $20,500.00; and (e) the 
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H balance divided equally between the parties. 
11. Respondent Mark Olsen's efforts to maintain, improve, and enhance the Ogden 
Canyon cabins, together with his pre-marital contribution of $15,170.00, entitles him to an 
equitable interest in the cabins of $30,000.00. 
12. Accordingly, Petitioner Carolyn Olsen shall be awarded both cabins located in Ogden 
Canyon subject to an equitable interest therein of $30,000.00 to Respondent Mark Olsen. 
13. The Wyoming property shall be awarded to Respondent Mark Olsen as his sole and 
separate property at a value of $140,000.00, considering the parties own a fractionalized interest 
in 40 acres. 
14. Since there is no established controlling law, the Court determines Carolyn Olsen's 
social security benefits are a marital asset and therefore credits her with $115,435.24 of marital 
property, the present fair market value of her social security. 
15. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen is awarded her 401(k) retirement plan through the Utah 
State Retirement Systems valued as of December 31,2003, in the sum of $119,520.00. 
16. Respondent Mark Olsen is awarded one-half Q/z) of the retirement benefits accrued 
during the marriage of Petitioner Carolyn Olsen's defined benefit retirement plan, a pension plan, 
through the Utah State Retirement System, from the date of the parties' marriage on May 5, 
1978, until entry of the parties' Decree of Divorce. The percentage to be awarded Mark Olsen is 
calculated as follows: 
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f 
y. Months of credited service 
earned during marriage 
total months of retirement coverage x 50% = Alternate Payee's portion 
17. Respondent Mark Olsen is awarded all of his Thrift Savings Plan valued at 
$93,639.00 as of December 31, 2003, the same date as Carolyn Olsen's plan. 
18. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen is awarded one-half QA) of the retirement benefits accrued 
during the marriage of Respondent Mark Olsen's defined benefit retirement plan designated as 
CSRS with Petitioner Carolyn Olsen being awarded one-half QA) of all retirement benefits in the 
retirement plan from May 5, 1978, date of marriage, until date of entry of the parties' Decree of 
Divorce. The percentage to be awarded Carolyn Olsen is calculated as follows: 
Months of credited service 
earned during marriage 
total months of retirement coverage x 50% = Alternate Payee's portion 
19. Respondent Mark Olsen's 240 hours of accumulated annual leave is not a marital 
asset and Respondent Mark Olsen is awarded all of his accumulated annual leave as his sole and 
separate property. 
20. The Court awards to Petitioner Carolyn Olsen the following marital assets, valued as 
follows: 
(a) $ 60,000.00 Marital interest in cabins 
(b) $ 115,434.00 Social Security benefits (present value) 
(c) $119,520.00 Carolyn Olsen's 401k Plan 
(d) $ 13,973.00 Personal property and household goods 
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S (e) $ 13,575.00 2001 Subaru motor vehicle 
$322,502.00 Total 
21. The Court awards to Respondent Mark Olsen the following marital assets valued as 
follows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(0 
(g) 
(h) 
(I) 
0) 
(k) 
(1) 
(m) 
$140,000.00 
$ 93,639.00 
$ 27,492.00 
$ 12,663.00 
$ 18,000.00 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 3,500.00 
$ 2,250.00 
$ 1,375.00 
$ 2,690.00 
$ 700.00 
$ 100.00 
$ 250.00 
$303,659.00 
Wyoming property 
Thrift Savings Plan 
Marital savings 
Personal property and household goods 
Backhoe 
Use of pickup 
Motor home 
Boat 
Horse trailer 
1994 Subaru 
Sheep camp 
Mule 
Generator 
Total 
22. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen shall pay to Respondent $9,421.50 at the time of sale of the 
martial residence to equalize the parties' marital assets. 
23. Each party shall pay their own debts and obligations either may have incurred after 
separation in November of 2003, holding the other party harmless. 
24. Neither party shall take any further advances against the existing line of credit on the 
marital residence. 
25. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen shall assume and pay, holding Respondent Mark Olsen 
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harmless on the following debts and obligations: Key Bank, Dillards, Meier & Frank, and 
Mervyns. 
26. The parties shall share equally the appraisal and accounting fees incurred by the 
parties in these proceedings. Mark Olsen has paid $400.00 to have the cabins appraised, 
$2,250.00 to have the Wyoming property appraised, and $560.00 to Brent Griffiths, CPA. 
Carolyn Olsen has paid $400.00 Livingston personal property appraisal, $400.00 to appraise the 
marital residence, and $650.00 to appraise the Wyoming property. Carolyn Olsen shall pay to 
Mark Olsen, at the time of sale of the marital residence, $880.00 to equalize the appraisal and 
accounting fees. 
27. Respondent Mark Olsen has the ability to pay $862.00 per month alimony to meet the 
unmet financial needs of Petitioner Carolyn Olsen. Petitioner Carolyn Olsen is hereby awarded 
$862.00 per month alimony from Respondent Mark Olsen effective July 1, 2005. 
28. Alimony to Petitioner, Carolyn A. Olsen shall terminate upon the first of the 
occurrence of any of the following events: (a) 320 months from July 1, 2005, which is 26 years 
and 9 months, the Court disallowing May and June, 2005, as the Court is extending Respondent 
Mark Olsen's obligation to pay temporary alimony and child support for those two months; (b) 
Petitioner Carolyn Olsen's co-habitation as defined by law; (c) Petitioner Carolyn Olsen's 
remarriage; or (d) the demise of Petitioner Carolyn Olsen or Respondent Mark Olsen. 
29. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees. 
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30. Respondent Mark Olsen is restrained from harming, harassing, attempting to cause 
any domestic violence to Petitioner Carolyn Olsen, or coming to Petitioner Carolyn Olsen's 
residence or any of its premises or to her place of employment. 
31. Respondent Mark Olsen should remain the trustee of Jesse Olsen's Uniform Transfer 
to Minors Account so long as he contributes the sum of $100.00 per month toward this account 
commencing July, 2005. In the event Respondent Mark Olsen fails to contribute in any month 
$100.00 to this account, Respondent Mark Olsen shall be replaced by Petitioner Carolyn Olsen as 
the custodian of that account. 
32. The parties shall file their taxes for the tax year 2004 by using the most advantageous 
method. 
DATED this ^ / day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Martin W. Custen 
Attorney for Mark Olsen 
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42 U.S.C.A. § 402 
Effective: [See Notes] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
*H Chapter 7. Social Security (Refs & Annos) 
*» Subchapter II. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (Refs & Annos) 
-+§ 402. Old-age and survivors insurance benefit payments 
(a) Old-age insurance benefits 
Every individual who--
(1) is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 414(a) of this title), 
(2) has attained age 62, and 
(3) has filed application for old-age insurance benefits or was entitled to disability insurance benefits for the 
month preceding the month in which he attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), 
shall be entitled to an old-age insurance benefit for each month, beginning with-
(A) in the case of an individual who has attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), the 
first month in which such individual meets the criteria specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), or 
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained age 62, but has not attained retirement age (as defined in 
section 416(1) of this title), the first month throughout which such individual meets the criteria specified in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) (if in that month he meets the criterion specified in paragraph (3)), 
and ending with the month preceding the month in which he dies. Except as provided in subsection (q) and 
subsection (w) of this section, such individual's old-age insurance benefit for any month shall be equal to his 
primary insurance amount (as defined in section 415(a) of this title) for such month. 
(b) Wife's insurance benefits 
(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this 
title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such wife or such divorced wife-
(A) has filed application for wife's insurance benefits, 
(B) has attained age 62 or (in the case of a wife) has in her care (individually or jointly with such individual) at 
the time of filing such application a child entitled to a child's insurance benefit on the basis of the wages and 
self-employment income of such individual, 
(C) in the case of a divorced wife, is not married, and 
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(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age or disability insurance 
benefits based on a primary insurance amount which is less than one-half of the primary insurance amount of 
such individual, 
shall (subject to subsection (s) of this section) be entitled to a wife's insurance benefit for each month, beginning 
with— 
(i) in the case of a wife or divorced wife (as so defined) of an individual entitled to old-age benefits, if such 
wife or divorced wife has attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), the first month in 
which she meets the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), or 
(ii) in the case of a wife or divorced wife (as so defined) of~ 
(I) an individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits, if such wife or divorced wife has not attained 
retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), or 
(II) an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits, 
the first month throughout which she is such a wife or divorced wife and meets the criteria specified in 
subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) (if in such month she meets the criterion specified in subparagraph (A)), 
whichever is earlier, and ending with the month preceding the month in which any of the following occurs-
(E) she dies, 
(F) such individual dies, 
(G) in the case of a wife, they are divorced and either (i) she has not attained age 62, or (ii) she has attained age 
62 but has not been married to such individual for a period of 10 years immediately before the date the divorce 
became effective, 
(H) in the case of a divorced wife, she marries a person other than such individual, 
(I) in the case of a wife who has not attained age 62, no child of such individual is entitled to a child's insurance 
benefit, 
(J) she becomes entitled to an old-age or disability insurance benefit based on a primary insurance amount which 
is equal to or exceeds one-half of the primary insurance amount of such individual, or 
(K) such individual is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits. 
(2) Except as provided in subsections (k)(5) and (q) of this section, such wife's insurance benefit for each month 
shall be equal to one-half of the primary insurance amount of her husband (or, in the case of a divorced wife, her 
former husband) for such month. 
(3) In the case of any divorced wife who marries— 
(A) an individual entitled to benefits under subsection (c), (f), (g), or (h) of this section, or 
(B) an individual who has attained the age of 18 and is entitled to benefits under subsection (d) of this section, 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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such divorced wife's entitlement to benefits under this subsection shall, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 
(1) (but subject to subsection (s) of this section), not be terminated by reason of such marriage. 
(4)(A) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this subsection, except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
divorced wife of an individual who is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, but who has attained 
age 62 and is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 414 of this title), if such divorced wife--
(i) meets the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1), and 
(ii) has been divorced from such insured individual for not less than 2 years, 
shall be entitled to a wife's insurance benefit under this subsection for each month, in such amount, and beginning 
and ending with such months, as determined (under regulations of the Commissioner of Social Security) in the 
manner otherwise provided for wife's insurance benefits under this subsection, as if such insured individual had 
become entitled to old-age insurance benefits on the date on which the divorced wife first meets the criteria for 
entitlement set forth in clauses (i) and (ii). 
(B) A wife's insurance benefit provided under this paragraph which has not otherwise terminated in accordance 
with subparagraph (E), (F), (H), or (J) of paragraph (1) shall terminate with the month preceding the first month in 
which the insured individual is no longer a fully insured individual. 
(5) Redesignated (4) 
(c) Husband's insurance benefits 
(1) The husband (as defined in section 416(f) of this title) and every divorced husband (as defined in section 416(d) 
of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such husband or such divorced 
husband-
(A) has filed application for husband's insurance benefits, 
(B) has attained age 62 or (in the case of a husband) has in his care (individually or jointly with such individual) 
at the time of filing such application a child entitled to child's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and 
self-employment income of such individual, 
(C) in the case of a divorced husband, is not married, and 
(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age or disability insurance 
benefits based on a primary insurance amount which is less than one-half of the primary insurance amount of 
such individual, 
shall (subject to subsection (s) of this section) be entitled to a husband's insurance benefit for each month, 
beginning with--
(i) in the case of a husband or divorced husband (as so defined) of an individual who is entitled to an old-age 
insurance benefit, if such husband or divorced husband has attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) 
of this title), the first month in which he meets the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), or 
(ii) in the case of a husband or divorced husband (as so defined) of~ 
(I) an individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits, if such husband or divorced husband has not attained 
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retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), or 
(II) an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits, 
the first month throughout which he is such a husband or divorced husband and meets the criteria 
specified in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) (if in such month he meets the criterion specified in 
subparagraph (A)), 
whichever is earlier, and ending with the month preceding the month in which any of the following occurs: 
(E) he dies, 
(F) such individual dies, 
(G) in the case of a husband, they are divorced and either (i) he has not attained age 62, or (ii) he has attained 
age 62 but has not been married to such individual for a period of 10 years immediately before the divorce 
became effective, 
(H) in the case of a divorced husband, he marries a person other than such individual, 
(I) in the case of a husband who has not attained age 62, no child of such individual is entitled to a child's 
insurance benefit, 
(J) he becomes entitled to an old-age or disability insurance benefit based on a primary insurance amount which 
is equal to or exceeds one-half of the primary insurance amount of such individual, or 
(K) such individual is not entitled to disability insurance benefits and is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits. 
(2) Except as provided in subsections (k)(5) and (q) of this section, such husband's insurance benefit for each 
month shall be equal to one-half of the primary insurance amount of his wife (or, in the case of a divorced husband, 
his former wife) for such month. 
(3) In the case of any divorced husband who marries— 
(A) an individual entitled to benefits under subsection (b), (e), (g), or (h) of this section, or 
(B) an individual who has attained the age of 18 and is entitled to benefits under subsection (d) of this section, by 
reason of paragraph (l)(B)(ii) thereof, 
such divorced husband's entitlement to benefits under this subsection, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 
(1) (but subject to subsection (s) of this section), shall not be terminated by reason of such marriage. 
(4)(A) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this subsection, except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
divorced husband of an individual who is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, but who has 
attained age 62 and is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 414 of this title), if such divorced husband--
(i) meets the requirements of subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1), and 
(ii) has been divorced from such insured individual for not less than 2 years, 
shall be entitled to a husband's insurance benefit under this subsection for each month, in such amount, and 
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beginning and ending with such months, as determined (under regulations of the Commissioner of Social Security) 
in the manner otherwise provided for husband's insurance benefits under this subsection, as if such insured 
individual had become entitled to old-age insurance benefits on the date on which the divorced husband first meets 
the criteria for entitlement set forth in clauses (i) and (ii). 
(B) A husband's insurance benefit provided under this paragraph which has not otherwise terminated in accordance 
with subparagraph (E), (F), (H), or (J) of paragraph (1) shall terminate with the month preceding the first month in 
which the insured individual is no longer a fully insured individual. 
(5) Redesignated (4) 
(d) Child's insurance benefits 
(1) Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance 
benefits, or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child— 
(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits, 
(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a 
full-time elementary or secondary school student and had not attained the age of 19, or (ii) is under a disability 
(as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which began before he attained the age of 22, and 
(C) was dependent upon such individual— 
(i) if such individual is living, at the time such application was filed, 
(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death, or 
(iii) if such individual had a period of disability which continued until he became entitled to old-age or 
disability insurance benefits, or (if he has died) until the month of his death, at the beginning of such period of 
disability or at the time he became entitled to such benefits, 
shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with— 
(i) in the case of a child (as so defined) of such an individual who has died, the first month in which such child 
meets the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), or 
(ii) in case of a child (as so defined) of an individual entitled to an old-age insurance benefit or to a disability 
insurance benefit, the first month throughout which such child is a child (as so defined) and meets the criteria 
specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C) (if in such month he meets the criterion specified in subparagraph (A)), 
whichever is earlier, and ending with the month preceding whichever of the following first occurs-
(D) the month in which such child dies or marries, 
(E) the month in which such child attains the age of 18, but only if he (i) is not under a disability (as so defined) 
at the time he attains such age, and (ii) is not a full-time elementary or secondary school student during any part 
of such month, 
(F) if such child was not under a disability (as so defined) at the time he attained the age of 18, the earlier of-
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(i) the first month during no part of which he is a full-time elementary or secondary school student, or 
(ii) the month in which he attains the age of 19, 
but only if he was not under a disability (as so defined) in such earlier month; 
(G) if such child was under a disability (as so defined) at the time he attained the age of 18 or if he was not under 
a disability (as so defined) at such time but was under a disability (as so defined) at or prior to the time he 
attained (or would attain) the age of 2 2 -
(i) the termination month, subject to section 423(e) of this title (and for purposes of this subparagraph, the 
termination month for any individual shall be the third month following the month in which his disability 
ceases; except that, in the case of an individual who has a period of trial work which ends as determined by 
application of section 422(c)(4)(A) of this title, the termination month shall be the earlier of (I) the third month 
following the earliest month after the end of such period of trial work with respect to which such individual is 
determined to no longer be suffering from a disabling physical or mental impairment, or (II) the third month 
following the earliest month in which such individual engages or is determined able to engage in substantial 
gainful activity, but in no event earlier than the first month occurring after the 36 months following such 
period of trial work in which he engages or is determined able to engage in substantial gainful activity), 
or (if later) the earlier of~ 
(ii) the first month during no part of which he is a full-time elementary or secondary school student, or 
(iii) the month in which he attains the age of 19, 
but only if he was not under a disability (as so defined) in such earlier month; or 
(H) if the benefits under this subsection are based on the wages and self-employment income of a stepparent who 
is subsequently divorced from such child's natural parent, the month after the month in which such divorce 
becomes final. 
Entitlement of any child to benefits under this subsection on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of 
an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits shall also end with the month before the first month for which 
such individual is not entitled to such benefits unless such individual is, for such later month, entitled to old-age 
insurance benefits or unless he dies in such month. No payment under this paragraph may be made to a child who 
would not meet the definition of disability in section 423(d) of this title except for paragraph (1)(B) thereof for any 
month in which he engages in substantial gainful activity. 
(2) Such child's insurance benefit for each month shall, if the individual on the basis of whose wages and 
self-employment income the child is entitled to such benefit has not died prior to the end of such month, be equal 
to one-half of the primary insurance amount of such individual for such month. Such child's insurance benefit for 
each month shall, if such individual has died in or prior to such month, be equal to three-fourths of the primary 
insurance amount of such individual. 
(3) A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or his mother or adopting mother at the 
time specified in paragraph (1)(C) of this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with or 
contributing to the support of such child and~ 
(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or 
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(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to 
section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3) of this title shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual. 
(4) A child shall be deemed dependent upon his stepfather or stepmother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) 
of this subsection if, at such time, the child was receiving at least one-half of his support from such stepfather or 
stepmother. 
(5) In the case of a child who has attained the age of eighteen and who marries— 
(A) an individual entitled to benefits under subsection (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section or under 
section 423(a) of this title, or 
(B) another individual who has attained the age of eighteen and is entitled to benefits under this subsection, 
such child's entitlement to benefits under this subsection shall, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of 
this subsection but subject to subsection (s) of this section, not be terminated by reason of such marriage. 
(6) A child whose entitlement to child's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment income 
of an insured individual terminated with the month preceding the month in which such child attained the age of 18, 
or with a subsequent month, may again become entitled to such benefits (provided no event specified in paragraph 
(1)(D) has occurred) beginning with the first month thereafter in which he— 
(A) (i) is a full-time elementary or secondary school student and has not attained the age of 19, or (ii) is under a 
disability (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) and has not attained the age of 22, or 
(B) is under a disability (as so defined) which began (i) before the close of the 84th month following the month 
in which his most recent entitlement to child's insurance benefits terminated because he ceased to be under such 
disability, or (ii) after the close of the 84th month following the month in which his most recent entitlement to 
child's insurance benefits terminated because he ceased to be under such disability due to performance of 
substantial gainful activity, 
but only if he has filed application for such reentitlement. Such reentitlement shall end with the month preceding 
whichever of the following first occurs: 
(C) the first month in which an event specified in paragraph (1)(D) occurs; 
(D) the earlier of (i) the first month during no part of which he is a full-time elementary or secondary school 
student or (ii) the month in which he attains the age of 19, but only if he is not under a disability (as so defined) 
in such earlier month; or 
(E) if he was under a disability (as so defined), the termination month (as defined in paragraph (l)(G)(i)), subject 
to section 423(e) of this title or (if later) the earlier of~ 
(i) the first month during no part of which he is a full-time elementary or secondary school student, or 
(ii) the month in which he attains the age of 19. 
(7) For the purposes of this subsection-
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(A) A "full-time elementary or secondary school student" is an individual who is in full-time attendance as a 
student at an elementary or secondary school, as determined by the Commissioner of Social Security (in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioner) in the light of the standards and practices of the 
schools involved, except that no individual shall be considered a "full-time elementary or secondary school 
student" if he is paid by the his employer while attending an elementary or secondary school at the request, or 
pursuant to a requirement, of his employer. An individual shall not be considered a "full-time elementary or 
secondary school student" for the purpose of this section while that individual is confined in a jail, prison, or 
other penal institution or correctional facility, pursuant to his conviction of an offense (committed after the 
effective date of this sentence) which constituted a felony under applicable law. An individual who is 
determined to be a full-time elementary or secondary school student shall be deemed to be such a student 
throughout the month with respect to which such determination is made. 
(B) Except to the extent provided in such regulations, an individual shall be deemed to be a full-time elementary 
or secondary school student during any period of nonattendance at an elementary or secondary school at which 
he has been in full-time attendance if (i) such period is 4 calendar months or less, and (ii) he shows to the 
satisfaction of the Commissioner of Social Security that he intends to continue to be in full-time attendance at an 
elementary or secondary school immediately following such period. An individual who does not meet the 
requirement of clause (ii) with respect to such period of nonattendance shall be deemed to have met such 
requirement (as of the beginning of such period) if he is in full-time attendance at an elementary or secondary 
school immediately following such period. 
(C)(i) An "elementary or secondary school" is a school which provides elementary or secondary education, 
respectively, as determined under the law of the State or other jurisdiction in which it is located. 
(ii) For the purpose of determining whether a child is a "full-time elementary or secondary school student" or 
"intends to continue to be in full-time attendance at an elementary or secondary school", within the meaning of 
this subsection, there shall be disregarded any education provided, or to be provided, beyond grade 12. 
(D) A child who attains age 19 at a time when he is a full-time elementary or secondary school student (as 
defined in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and without application of subparagraph (B) of such paragraph) 
but has not (at such time completed the requirements for, or received, a diploma or equivalent certificate from a 
secondary school (as defined in subparagraph (C)(i)) shall be deemed (for purposes of determining whether his 
entitlement to benefits under this subsection has terminated under paragraph (1)(F) and for purposes of 
determining his initial entitlement to such benefits under clause (i) of paragraph (1)(B)) not to have attained such 
age until the first day of the first month following the end of the quarter or semester in which he is enrolled at 
such time (or, if the elementary or secondary school (as defined in this paragraph) in which he is enrolled is not 
operated on a quarter or semester system, until the first day of the first month following the completion of the 
course in which he is so enrolled or until the first day of the third month beginning after such time, whichever 
first occurs). 
(8) In the case of— 
(A) an individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits (other than an individual referred to in subparagraph (B)), 
or 
(B) an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits, or an individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits 
who was entitled to disability insurance benefits for the month preceding the first month for which he was 
entitled to old-age insurance benefits, 
a child of such individual adopted after such individual became entitled to such old-age or disability insurance 
benefits shall be deemed not to meet the requirements of clause (i) or (iii) of paragraph (1)(C) unless such child— 
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(C) is the natural child or stepchild of such individual (including such a child who was legally adopted by such 
individual), or 
(D)(i) was legally adopted by such individual in an adoption decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction within 
the United States, and 
(ii) in the case of a child who attained the age of 18 prior to the commencement of proceedings for adoption, the 
child was living with or receiving at least one-half of the child's support from such individual for the year 
immediately preceding the month in which the adoption is decreed. 
(9)(A) A child who is a child of an individual under clause (3) of the first sentence of section 416(e) of this title 
and is not a child of such individual under clause (1) or (2) of such first sentence shall be deemed not to be 
dependent on such individual at the time specified in subparagraph (1)(C) of this subsection unless (i) such child 
was living with such individual in the United States and receiving at least one-half of his support from such 
individual (I) for the year immediately before the month in which such individual became entitled to old-age 
insurance benefits or disability insurance benefits or died, or (II) if such individual had a period of disability which 
continued until he had become entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or disability insurance benefits, or died, for 
the year immediately before the month in which such period of disability began, and (ii) the period during which 
such child was living with such individual began before the child attained age 18. 
(B) In the case of a child who was born in the one-year period during which such child must have been living with 
and receiving at least one-half of his support from such individual, such child shall be deemed to meet such 
requirements for such period if, as of the close of such period, such child has lived with such individual in the 
United States and received at least one-half of his support from such individual for substantially all of the period 
which begins on the date of such child's birth. 
(10) For purposes of paragraph (1)(H)~ 
(A) each stepparent shall notify the Commissioner of Social Security of any divorce upon such divorce becoming 
final; and 
(B) the Commissioner shall annually notify any stepparent of the rule for termination described in paragraph 
(1)(H) and of the requirement described in subparagraph (A). 
(e) Widow's insurance benefits 
(1) The widow (as defined in section 416(c) of this title) and every surviving divorced wife (as defined in section 
416(d) of this title) of an individual who died a fully insured individual, if such widow or such surviving divorced 
wife— 
(A) is not married, 
(B) (i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50 but has not attained age 60 and is under a disability (as 
defined in section 423(d) of this title) which began before the end of the period specified in paragraph (4), 
(C)(i) has filed application for widow's insurance benefits, 
(ii) was entitled to wife's insurance benefits, on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such 
individual, for the month preceding the month in which such individual died, and~ 
(I) has attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), 
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(II) is not entitled to benefits under subsection (a) of this section or section 423 of this title, or 
(III) has in effect a certificate (described in paragraph (8)) filed by her with the Commissioner of Social 
Security, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Social Security, in which she 
elects to receive widow's insurance benefits (subject to reduction as provided in subsection (q) of this section), 
or 
(iii) was entitled, on the basis of such wages and self-employment income, to mother's insurance benefits for the 
month preceding the month in which she attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), and 
(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less 
than the primary insurance amount (as determined after application of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph 
(2)) of such deceased individual, 
shall be entitled to a widow's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with-
(E) if she satisfies subparagraph (B) by reason of clause (i) thereof, the first month in which she becomes so 
entitled to such insurance benefits, or 
(F) if she satisfies subparagraph (B) by reason of clause (ii) thereof-
(i) the first month after her waiting period (as defined in paragraph (5)) in which she becomes so entitled to 
such insurance benefits, or 
(ii) the first month during all of which she is under a disability and in which she becomes so entitled to such 
insurance benefits, but only if she was previously entitled to insurance benefits under this subsection on the 
basis of being under a disability and such first month occurs (I) in the period specified in paragraph (4) and 
(II) after the month in which a previous entitlement to such benefits on such basis terminated, 
and ending with the month preceding the first month in which any of the following occurs: she remarries, dies, 
becomes entitled to an old-age insurance benefit equal to or exceeding the primary insurance amount (as 
determined after application of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (2)) of such deceased individual, or, if 
she became entitled to such benefits before she attained age 60, subject to section 423(e) of this title, the 
termination month (unless she attains retirement age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title) on or before the 
last day of such termination month). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the termination month for any 
individual shall be the third month following the month in which her disability ceases; except that, in the case 
of an individual who has a period of trial work which ends as determined by application of section 
422(c)(4)(A) of this title, the termination month shall be the earlier of (I) the third month following the earliest 
month after the end of such period of trial work with respect to which such individual is determined to no 
longer be suffering from a disabling physical or mental impairment, or (II) the third month following the 
earliest month in which such individual engages or is determined able to engage in substantial gainful activity, 
but in no event earlier than the first month occurring after the 36 months following such period of trial work in 
which she engages or is determined able to engage in substantial gainful activity. 
(2)(A) Except as provided in subsection (k)(5) of this section, subsection (q) of this section, and subparagraph (D) 
of this paragraph, such widow's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to the primary insurance amount 
(as determined for purposes of this subsection after application of subparagraphs (B) and (C)) of such deceased 
individual. 
(B)(i) For purposes of this subsection, in any case in which such deceased individual dies before attaining age 62 
and section 415(a)(1) of this title (as in effect after December 1978) is applicable in determining such individual's 
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primary insurance amount— 
(I) such primary insurance amount shall be determined under the formula set forth in section 415(a)(l)(B)(i) and 
(ii) of this title which is applicable to individuals who initially become eligible for old-age insurance benefits in 
the second year after the year specified in clause (ii), 
(II) the year specified in clause (ii) shall be substituted for the second calendar year specified in section 
415(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I) of this title, and 
(III) such primary insurance amount shall be increased under section 415(i) of this title as if it were the primary 
insurance amount referred to in section 415(i)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of this title, except that it shall be increased only for 
years beginning after the first year after the year specified in clause (ii). 
(ii) The year specified in this clause is the earlier of~ 
(I) the year in which the deceased individual attained age 60, or would have attained age 60 had he lived to that 
age, or 
(II) the second year preceding the year in which the widow or surviving divorced wife first meets the 
requirements of paragraph (1)(B) or the second year preceding the year in which the deceased individual died, 
whichever is later. 
(iii) This subparagraph shall apply with respect to any benefit under this subsection only to the extent its 
application does not result in a primary insurance amount for purposes of this subsection which is less than the 
primary insurance amount otherwise determined for such deceased individual under section 415 of this title. 
(C) If such deceased individual was (or upon application would have been) entitled to an old-age insurance benefit 
which was increased (or subject to being increased) on account of delayed retirement under the provisions of 
subsection (w) of this section, then, for purposes of this subsection, such individual's primary insurance amount, if 
less than the old-age insurance benefit (increased, where applicable, under section 415(f)(5), 415(f)(6), or 
415(f)(9)(B) of this title and under section 415(i) of this title as if such individual were still alive in the case of an 
individual who has died) which he was receiving (or would upon application have received) for the month prior to 
the month in which he died, shall be deemed to be equal to such old-age insurance benefit, and (notwithstanding 
the provisions of paragraph (3) of subsection (w) of this section) the number of increment months shall include any 
month in the months of the calendar year in which he died, prior to the month in which he died, which satisfy the 
conditions in paragraph (2) of subsection (w) of this section. 
(D) If the deceased individual (on the basis of whose wages and self-employment income a widow or surviving 
divorced wife is entitled to widow's insurance benefits under this subsection) was, at any time, entitled to an 
old-age insurance benefit which was reduced by reason of the application of subsection (q) of this section, the 
widow's insurance benefit of such widow or surviving divorced wife for any month shall, if the amount of the 
widow's insurance benefit of such widow or surviving divorced wife (as determined under subparagraph (A) and 
after application of subsection (q) of this section) is greater than-
(i) the amount of the old-age insurance benefit to which such deceased individual would have been entitled (after 
application of subsection (q) of this section) for such month if such individual were still living and section 
415(f)(5), 415(f)(6), or 415(f)(9)(B) of this title were applied, where applicable, and 
(ii) 82 1/2 percent of the primary insurance amount (as determined without regard to subparagraph (C)) of such 
deceased individual, 
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Effective: October 21,1998 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
*l Chapter 7. Social Security (Refs & Annos) 
*a Subchapter II. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (Refs & Annos) 
-•§ 407. Assignment; amendment of section 
(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at 
law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to 
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or 
insolvency law. 
(b) No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or 
otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this 
section. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit withholding taxes from any benefit under this subchapter, 
if such withholding is done pursuant to a request made in accordance with section 3402(p)(l) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C.A. § 3402] by the person entitled to such benefit or such person's representative 
payee. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title II, § 207, 49 Stat. 624; Aug. 10, 1939, c. 666, Title II, § 201, 53 Stat. 1372; Apr. 20, 
1983, Pub.L. 98-21, Title III, § 335(a), 97 Stat. 130; Oct. 21, 1998, Pub.L. 105-277, Div. J, Title IV, § 4005(a), 
112 Stat. 2681-911.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1983 Acts. Senate Report No. 98-23, House Report No. 98-25, and House Conference Report No. 98-47, see 1983 
U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 143. 
1998 Acts. Statement by President, see 1998 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 582. 
References in text 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. 
Codifications 
In subsec. (b), "April 20, 1983" was substituted for "the date of the enactment of this section", which was 
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Effective: December 14,1999 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
Chapter 7. Social Security (Refs & Annos) 
*a Subchapter IV. Grants to States for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children and for 
Child-Welfare Services (Refs & Annos) 
*! Part D. Child Support and Establishment of Paternity (Refs & Annos) 
-•§ 659. Consent by the United States to income withholding, garnishment, and similar 
proceedings for enforcement of child support and alimony obligations 
(a) Consent to support enforcement 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 407 of this title and section 5301 of Title 38), 
effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due 
from, or payable by, the United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivision, or 
instrumentality thereof) to any individual, including members of the Armed Forces of the United States, shall be 
subject, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were a private 
person, to withholding in accordance with State law enacted pursuant to subsections (a)(1) and (b) of section 666 
of this title and regulations of the Secretary under such subsections, and to any other legal process brought, by a 
State agency administering a program under a State plan approved under this part or by an individual obligee, to 
enforce the legal obligation of the individual to provide child support or alimony. 
(b) Consent to requirements applicable to private person 
With respect to notice to withhold income pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (b) of section 666 of this title, or any 
other order or process to enforce support obligations against an individual (if the order or process contains or is 
accompanied by sufficient data to permit prompt identification of the individual and the moneys involved), each 
governmental entity specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to the same requirements as would 
apply if the entity were a private person, except as otherwise provided in this section. 
(c) Designation of agent; response to notice or process 
(1) Designation of agent 
The head of each agency subject to this section shall-
(A) designate an agent or agents to receive orders and accept service of process in matters relating to child 
support or alimony; and 
(B) annually publish in the Federal Register the designation of the agent or agents, identified by title or 
position, mailing address, and telephone number. 
(2) Response to notice or process 
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If an agent designated pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection receives notice pursuant to State procedures in 
effect pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (b) of section 666 of this title, or is effectively served with any order, 
process, or interrogatory, with respect to an individual's child support or alimony payment obligations, the agent 
shall-
(A) as soon as possible (but not later than 15 days) thereafter, send written notice of the notice or service 
(together with a copy of the notice or service) to the individual at the duty station or last-known home address 
of the individual; 
(B) within 30 days (or such longer period as may be prescribed by applicable State law) after receipt of a 
notice pursuant to such State procedures, comply with all applicable provisions of section 666 of this title; and 
(C) within 30 days (or such longer period as may be prescribed by applicable State law) after effective service 
of any other such order, process, or interrogatory, withhold available sums in response to the order or process, 
or answer the interrogatory. 
(d) Priority of claims 
If a governmental entity specified in subsection (a) of this section receives notice or is served with process, as 
provided in this section, concerning amounts owed by an individual to more than 1 person— 
(1) support collection under section 666(b) of this title must be given priority over any other process, as provided 
in section 666(b)(7) of this title; 
(2) allocation of moneys due or payable to an individual among claimants under section 666(b) of this title shall 
be governed by section 666(b) of this title and the regulations prescribed under such section; and 
(3) such moneys as remain after compliance with paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be available to satisfy any other 
such processes on a first-come, first-served basis, with any such process being satisfied out of such moneys as 
remain after the satisfaction of all such processes which have been previously served. 
(e) No requirement to vary pay cycles 
A governmental entity that is affected by legal process served for the enforcement of an individual's child support 
or alimony payment obligations shall not be required to vary its normal pay and disbursement cycle in order to 
comply with the legal process. 
(f) Relief from liability 
(1) Neither the United States, nor the government of the District of Columbia, nor any disbursing officer shall be 
liable with respect to any payment made from moneys due or payable from the United States to any individual 
pursuant to legal process regular on its face, if the payment is made in accordance with this section and the 
regulations issued to carry out this section. 
(2) No Federal employee whose duties include taking actions necessary to comply with the requirements of 
subsection (a) of this section with regard to any individual shall be subject under any law to any disciplinary action 
or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or on account of, any disclosure of information made by the employee in 
connection with the carrying out of such actions. 
(g) Regulations 
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Authority to promulgate regulations for the implementation of this section shall, insofar as this section applies to 
moneys due from (or payable by)— 
(1) the United States (other than the legislative or judicial branches of the Federal Government) or the 
government of the District of Columbia, be vested in the President (or the designee of the President); 
(2) the legislative branch of the Federal Government, be vested jointly in the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (or their designees), [FN1] and 
(3) the judicial branch of the Federal Government, be vested in the Chief Justice of the United States (or the 
designee of the Chief Justice). 
(h) Moneys subject to process 
(1) In general 
Subject to paragraph (2), moneys payable to an individual which are considered to be based upon remuneration 
for employment, for purposes of this section— 
(A) consist of— 
(i) compensation payable for personal services of the individual, whether the compensation is denominated 
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, pay, allowances, or otherwise (including severance pay, sick pay, and 
incentive pay); 
(ii) periodic benefits (including a periodic benefit as defined in section 428(h)(3) of this title) or other 
payments-
(I) under the insurance system established by subchapter II of this chapter; 
(II) under any other system or fund established by the United States which provides for the payment of 
pensions, retirement or retired pay, annuities, dependents' or survivors' benefits, or similar amounts 
payable on account of personal services performed by the individual or any other individual; 
(HI) as compensation for death under any Federal program; 
(TV) under any Federal program established to provide "black lung" benefits; or 
(V) by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs as compensation for a service-connected disability paid by the 
Secretary to a former member of the Armed Forces who is in receipt of retired or retainer pay if the 
former member has waived a portion of the retired or retainer pay in order to receive such compensation; 
(iii) worker's compensation benefits paid or payable under Federal or State law; 
(iv) benefits paid or payable under the Railroad Retirement System, [FN1] and 
(v) special benefits for certain World War II veterans payable under subchapter VIII of this chapter [42 
U.S.C.A. § 1001 etseq.]; but 
(B) do not include any payment— 
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(i) by way of reimbursement or otherwise, to defray expenses incurred by the individual in carrying out 
duties associated with the employment of the individual; 
(ii) as allowances for members of the uniformed services payable pursuant to chapter 7 of Title 37, as 
prescribed by the Secretaries concerned (defined by section 101(5) of Title 37) as necessary for the efficient 
performance of duty; or 
(iii) of periodic benefits under title 38, United States Code, except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii)(V). 
(2) Certain amounts excluded 
In determining the amount of any moneys due from, or payable by, the United States to any individual, there 
shall be excluded amounts which-
(A) are owed by the individual to the United States; 
(B) are required by law to be, and are, deducted from the remuneration or other payment involved, including 
Federal employment taxes, and fines and forfeitures ordered by court-martial; 
(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax purposes, if the withholding of the amounts is 
authorized or required by law and if amounts withheld are not greater than would be the case if the individual 
claimed all dependents to which he was entitled (the withholding of additional amounts pursuant to section 
3402(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 may be permitted only when the individual presents evidence of 
a tax obligation which supports the additional withholding); 
(D) are deducted as health insurance premiums; 
(E) are deducted as normal retirement contributions (not including amounts deducted for supplementary 
coverage); or 
(F) are deducted as normal life insurance premiums from salary or other remuneration for employment (not 
including amounts deducted for supplementary coverage). 
(i) Definitions 
For purposes of this section— 
(1) United States 
The term "United States" includes any department, agency, or instrumentality of the legislative, judicial, or 
executive branch of the Federal Government, the United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, any 
Federal corporation created by an Act of Congress that is wholly owned by the Federal Government, and the 
governments of the territories and possessions of the United States. 
(2) Child support 
The term "child support", when used in reference to the legal obligations of an individual to provide such 
support, means amounts required to be paid under a judgment, decree, or order, whether temporary, final, or 
subject to modification, issued by a court or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction, for the support 
and maintenance of a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing 
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State, or a child and the parent with whom the child is living, which provides for monetary support, health care, 
arrearages or reimbursement, and which may include other related costs and fees, interest and penalties, income 
withholding, attorney's fees, and other relief. 
(3) Alimony 
(A) In general 
The term "alimony", when used in reference to the legal obligations of an individual to provide the same, 
means periodic payments of funds for the support and maintenance of the spouse (or former spouse) of the 
individual, and (subject to and in accordance with State law) includes separate maintenance, alimony pendente 
lite, maintenance, and spousal support, and includes attorney's fees, interest, and court costs when and to the 
extent that the same are expressly made recoverable as such pursuant to a decree, order, or judgment issued in 
accordance with applicable State law by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(B) Exceptions 
Such term does not include— 
(i) any child support; or 
(ii) any payment or transfer of property or its value by an individual to the spouse or a former spouse of the 
individual in compliance with any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or 
other division of property between spouses or former spouses. 
(4) Private person 
The term "private person" means a person who does not have sovereign or other special immunity or privilege 
which causes the person not to be subject to legal process. 
(5) Legal process 
The term "legal process" means any writ, order, summons, or other similar process in the nature of garnishment-
(A) which is issued by— 
(i) a court or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction in any State, territory, or possession of the 
United States; 
(ii) a court or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction in any foreign country with which the 
United States has entered into an agreement which requires the United States to honor the process; or 
(iii) an authorized official pursuant to an order of such a court or an administrative agency of competent 
jurisdiction or pursuant to State or local law; and 
(B) which is directed to, and the purpose of which is to compel, a governmental entity which holds moneys 
which are otherwise payable to an individual to make a payment from the moneys to another party in order to 
satisfy a legal obligation of the individual to provide child support or make alimony payments. 
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Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
Chapter 7. Social Security (Refs & Annos) 
K
m Subchapter XL General Provisions, Peer Review, and Administrative Simplification (Refs & Annos) 
*s Part A. General Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
-f § 1304, Reservation of right to amend or repeal 
The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title XI, § 1104,49 Stat. 648.) 
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Rights and redistribution in the welfare system. William H. Simon, 38 Stan.L.Rev. 1431 (1986). 
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NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Power of Congress 1 
Vested rights doctrine 2 
1. Power of Congress 
Congress had authority to amend California's agreement to obtain social security coverage for employees of state 
and its political subdivisions, where Social Security Act expressly notified state that Congress retained power to 
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